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Abstract—We consider a learning system based on the conven-
tional multiplicative weight (MW) rule that combines experts’
advice to predict a sequence of true outcomes. It is assumed
that one of the experts is malicious and aims to impose the
maximum loss on the system. The loss of the system is naturally
defined to be the aggregate absolute difference between the
sequence of predicted outcomes and the true outcomes. We
consider this problem under both offline and online settings.
In the offline setting where the malicious expert must choose
its entire sequence of decisions a priori, we show somewhat
surprisingly that a simple greedy policy of always reporting false
prediction is asymptotically optimal with an approximation ratio
of 1 + O(
√
lnN
N
), where N is the total number of prediction
stages. In particular, we describe a policy that closely resembles
the structure of the optimal offline policy. For the online setting
where the malicious expert can adaptively make its decisions, we
show that the optimal online policy can be efficiently computed
by solving a dynamic program in O(N2). Our results provide
a new direction for vulnerability assessment of commonly-used
learning algorithms to adversarial attacks where the threat is an
integral part of the system.
Index Terms—Adversarial learning; expert advice; Markov
decision process; dynamic programming; approximation ratio.
I. INTRODUCTION
The focus of the vast literature on learning with expert
advice is coming up with good prediction rules for the
learning system even for the worst possible outcome sequence
[1]–[6]. However, the proposed algorithms are not designed
to be robust against malicious strategic experts. Given the
prevalence of machine learning algorithms and as a result,
automated decision making in distributed settings in many
real-world applications, the effect of malicious experts whose
goal is to destroy the performance of the system by injecting
false predictions cannot be ignored. In this paper, we address
this issue by analyzing the performance of the multiplicative
weighted (MW) learning algorithm [3], widely used in collab-
orative filtering, in the presence of malicious experts injecting
false recommendations.
There are many motivating examples for considering the
effect of malicious experts in real-world learning systems. To
name a few, one can consider movie recommendation systems
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such as IMDB or Netflix where the system relies on the users’
feedback (experts) to rate the quality of the movies. However,
the users do not always report the true ratings due to various
reasons such as manipulating the outcome of the system
toward their preferences [6], [7]. As another example, one can
consider sensor fusion in networks where a malicious sensor
can attempt to attack the system by injecting false signals and
cause the central decision-maker to reach incorrect decisions
[8]. Moreover, almost all cases of collaborative filtering or
distributed decision making are vulnerable to such internal
threats.
In this paper, we study the performance of the MW learning
algorithm against adversarial attacks where the adversary’s
goal is to attack the system without having control over the
system’s prediction rule. The MW update rule is one of the
most commonly used schemes for learning from expert advice
[1], [9], [10], in which after each stage of prediction, when
the true outcome is revealed, depending on whether the experts
were correct or wrong on that stage, the system punishes or
rewards the experts, respectively, by decreasing or increas-
ing their relative weights by a multiplicative factor. Thus,
learning with expert advice can be modeled in a multistage
sequential decision-making framework where at each stage,
the recommendation system combines the predictions of a
set of experts about an unknown outcome with the aim of
accurately predicting that outcome.
The problem that we consider here was originally proposed
in [11] and subsequently studied in [8], where it was shown
that in the case of logarithmic loss function the optimal online
policy for the malicious expert is a simple greedy policy.
This, however, is not quite surprising as the malicious expert’s
gain by reporting false predictions substantially dominates
his credibility loss due to the logarithmic nature of the loss
function. As it was shown using numerical analysis in [8], [11],
characterizing the optimal policy for the absolute loss function
(which is the more interesting case and commonly used in
MW learning systems) is much more challenging due to the
strong coupling between the gain in reporting false prediction
and the loss in credibility. In this work, we answer this
question by showing that the same simple greedy algorithm
is asymptotically optimal in the offline setting. Moreover, we
show that although the optimal online policy can have a
complicated structure, it can still be computed efficiently in
quadratic time using a reduced-size dynamic program.
The problem that we study in this paper also belongs to
the general family of many problems such as target tracking,
distributed detection under the byzantine attacks, Sybil attack,
and causative attack from the taxonomy of adversarial machine
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2learning where the attacker can modify the data in the training
or during the operation in order to degrade the performance
of a machine learning algorithm [12]–[15]. Our work is also
related to [16]–[18] in which a learner plays against an adver-
sary such that at each step the learner has to choose an expert
from a pool of experts to follow while the adversary adaptively
sets the gains for the experts with the aim of maximizing
the overall regret incurred by the learner. The authors in [17]
fully characterize the optimal online policies for the learner
and the adversary in the case of 2 and 3 experts and provide
some general insights into how to design an optimal algorithm
for the learner and the adversary for an arbitrary number of
experts. However, our work is different from those in the sense
that the experts in our setting are themselves malicious and can
act strategically. Moreover, the performance guarantee in our
setting is in terms of the approximation factor rather than the
conventional notion of regret.1
We consider the problem of learning with a malicious
strategic expert under both offline and online settings. More
specifically, we consider a system with two experts; one
honest and the other malicious. At each round, the honest
expert predicts the true outcome with some accuracy, while
the malicious expert strategically provides a prediction with
the goal of maximizing the loss incurred by the system.
We assume that the adversary knows the true outcome and
prediction rule of the learning system. For the offline setting,
we assume that the adversary reports his entire sequence of
predictions at the beginning of the game, while for the online
setting, the adversary is allowed to look at the past information
up to the current stage and then reports his next prediction.
The problem that we address in this paper is two-fold: From
the malicious expert’s point of view, we are interested in
knowing the optimal policy which imposes the maximum loss
on the learning system, while from the system designer’s
point of view we are interested in knowing how the widely-
applied MW learning algorithm performs in the presence of a
malicious expert.
As one of our main results we show that for the case
of absolute loss function, the optimal offline policy can be
approximated within a factor 1 +O(
√
lnN
N ) of the one which
reports false predictions at all the stages, where N is the
total number of prediction stages. This can be viewed as a
counterpart for the conventional regret minimization bounds
obtained for the MW update rule. Here it is worth noting
that obtaining such an approximation ratio is more challenging
than obtaining regret bounds commonly used in expert advice
settings. This is because the space of feasible policies is
exponentially larger than the set of feasible actions. Therefore,
for the offline setting, we approximate the best-in-hindsight
policy rather than the best-in-hindsight action. One implication
of our analysis under the offline setting is that the commonly
used MW learning algorithm is not robust with respect to
adversarial attacks as a naive malicious expert can impose
almost the same loss as an optimally strategic malicious expert.
1The regret of an algorithm is typically defined to be the difference between
payoffs of the best-in-hindsight action and the expected payoff obtained by
following the algorithm choices.
We then extend our results to the online setting and formulate
the optimal policy of an online adaptive adversary using a
dynamic program (DP). In particular, we show that the number
of states of this dynamic program grows only linearly in terms
of the number of game stages which allows us to compute the
optimal online policy for the malicious expert efficiently in
O(N2).
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we in-
troduce the model formally and discuss some of its salient
properties. In Section III, we provide our main results for the
case of offline malicious expert and absolute loss function. In
Section IV, we provide an efficient algorithm for computing
the optimal online policy. We conclude the paper by identify-
ing some future directions of research in Section V. For the
ease of presentation, we relegate the proof of auxiliary lemmas
to Appendix A.
Notation: For a positive integer n, we let [n] := {1, 2, . . . , n}.
We let X ∼ Ber(p) be a Bernoulli random variable with prob-
ability of success p, and X ∼ Bin(n, p) denote a Binomial
random variable with parameters n and p. The probability and
expectation of an event with respect to its ambient probability
space are denoted by P(·) and E[·], respectively. We denote the
cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal
distribution by Φ(·).
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first introduce the mathematical model
formally as in [11], and then provide some of its salient
properties which will be used in our later analysis. In the
remainder of this paper, we shall refer to the ill-intent expert
as a malicious expert or an adversary, interchangeably.
Consider a learning system with two experts. At each round
k = 0, 1, 2, . . ., expert i ∈ {1, 2} has a nonnegative weight
denoted by pik ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that both experts start with
equal initial weight p10 = p
2
0 = 1. We denote the prediction
of the ith expert at stage k by xik ∈ {0, 1}, and the true
outcome by yk ∈ {0, 1}. At stage k, the relative weight of
expert i ∈ {1, 2} is defined to be
p˜ik :=
pik
p1k + p
2
k
. (1)
In the kth stage, the learning system predicts the true outcome
yk using a weighted average rule given by
yˆk = p˜
1
kx
1
k + p˜
2
kx
2
k, (2)
and updates the experts’ weights in the next time step depend-
ing on whether they were correct or wrong in the previous
instance as follows
pik+1 =
{
pik if x
i
k 6= yk,
pik if x
i
k = yk.
(3)
Here  ∈ (0, 1) is a fixed constant parameter set the learning
system and reflects its aggressiveness on punishing/rewarding
the experts. After the true outcome yk is revealed, the system
incurs a loss l(yˆk, yk) = Q(|yˆk − yk|), where Q(·) : [0, 1] →
R≥0 can be some general nondecreasing function. In this
paper, we shall only focus on the absolute loss function
3Q(y) := y, as it is the most common loss function used in the
literature for the expert advice setting [3], [10].2
We assume that expert 2 is the honest expert who makes
a correct prediction with accuracy µ, i.e., the one that agrees
with the true outcome with probability µ:
x2k =
{
yk w.p. µ,
1− yk w.p. 1− µ.
Expert 1 is the malicious expert (adversary) who aims to
impose the maximum loss on the system by taking the best
adversarial action at each stage. We assume that expert 1
knows the true outcome yk at time k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, as well
as the distribution of x2k, the prediction of expert 2. Note that
the later is not a very restrictive assumption as the adversary
can always learn this distribution using the empirical history
of observed actions taken by the honest expert.
Definition 1. A malicious expert is called an offline adversary
if he chooses his entire of sequence of predictions {x1k}Nk=1 at
the beginning of the game and then commits to it. A malicious
expert is called an online adversary if the whole history of
predictions and true outcomes before time k are available to
him, i.e., {p˜1` , x1` , x2` , y` : ∀` ∈ [k − 1]}, and then he makes
the next decision x1k.
3
Finally, the goal of the malicious expert (either offline or
online) is to produce a sequence of predictions {x1k}Nk=1 over
a fixed finite horizon N in order to maximize the expected
aggregate loss on the system given by:
Ex21,...,x2N [
N∑
k=1
l(yˆk, yk)] =
N∑
k=1
Ex21,...,x2k [l(yˆk, yk)], (4)
where the second expectation is taken over the past and
current actions of the honest agent x21, . . . , x
2
k. In particu-
lar, an optimal policy for the offline/online malicious ex-
pert is a sequence of decisions which maximizes the ob-
jective function (4) with respect to its corresponding in-
formation set, i.e., a solution to the maximization problem
maxx11,...,x1N
∑N
k=1 Ex21,...,x2k [l(yˆk, yk)].
It is worth noting that one of the major differences between
the above model and the conventional expert advice problem
is that in the latter one assumes that all the experts are honest
and simply report their true recommendations. In particular,
the goal is to devise a learning scheme which combines
the experts’ recommendations in an intelligent manner to
accurately predict the unknown outcomes, where it can be
shown that the well-known MW learning rule achieves the
minimum regret bound. However, the above adversarial model
can be viewed as a dual to the expert advice problem where
the MW rule is fixed as the underlying learning process and
the goal to evaluate how well this learning rule will perform
in the presence of a malicious expert who strategically aims
to maximize the loss of the system.
2Other examples of loss functions include square loss Q(y) := y2 and
logarithmic loss Q(y) := − ln(1− y).
3In control theory literature, offline and online policies are referred to as
open-loop and state-feedback policies, respectively [19].
A. Preliminary Results
Here, we describe some of the important properties of the
aforementioned adversarial model which will be used later to
establish our main results. First we note that using the update
rule (3) and the definition of relative weights (1), we have
p˜1k+1 =

1
1+
(
1
p˜1
k
−1
)
1

if x1k = L, x
2
k = T,
1
1+
(
1
p˜1
k
−1
)

if x1k = T, x
2
k = L,
p˜1k if x
1
k = x
2
k,
(5)
where T (truth) and L (lie) denote whether the expert’s
prediction agrees with the true outcome or not, respectively.
In particular, from (5) one can easily see that the adversary’s
relative weight changes only when his prediction is at odds
with the prediction of the honest agent (when both experts
predict the same, the adversary’s relative weight remains
unchanged). As the update rule in (5) plays an important
role in our analysis, thus we define a weight update function
g(·) : (0, 1] → (0, 1] and its inverse g(−1)(·) : (0, 1] → (0, 1]
to be,
g(ρ) :=
1
1 +
(
1
ρ − 1
)
1

,
g(−1)(ρ) :=
1
1 +
(
1
ρ − 1
)

. (6)
As it can be seen in Figure 1 both g(ρ) and its inverse g(−1)(ρ)
are strictly increasing functions and we have,
g(ρ) ≤ ρ ≤ g−1(ρ),∀ρ ∈ (0, 1].
Fig. 1. Illustration of update function g(x) and its inverse for  = 1
e
.
An important feature of the functions g(ρ) and g(−1)(ρ) is
that for any integer j ∈ Z+, we have
g(j)(ρ) := g(. . . (g(ρ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
j times
=
1
1 +
(
1
ρ − 1
)
1
j
,
g(−j)(ρ) := g(−1)(. . . (g(−1)(ρ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
j times
=
1
1 +
(
1
ρ − 1
)
j
, (7)
where g(j)(ρ) and g(−j)(ρ) denote the composition of g(ρ)
and g(−1)(ρ) by themselves j times, respectively. In particular,
we note that g(0)(ρ) ≡ ρ.
4III. OPTIMAL OFFLINE POLICY FOR THE ABSOLUTE LOSS
FUCTION
In this section, we analyze the optimal policy for the offline
adversary and postpone our analysis for the case of the online
adversary to Section IV. We recall that the offline adversary
is the one who chooses his entire sequence of decisions
(predictions) at the beginning of the game. More precisely,
the offline adversary aims to maximize the expected loss of
the learning system given by (4) over all the 2N feasible
sequences of the form {L, T}N , where T (truth) and L (lie)
denote whether the malicious expert’s prediction agrees with
the true outcome or not, respectively. Note that although the
space of feasible solutions is exponentially large, however we
are only interested in obtaining polynomial-time computable
policies. Therefore, our goal here is to approximate the optimal
offline policy within only a negligible additive error term in
the overall objective cost.
Toward this end, we first establish a sequence of lemmas
to prove our main approximation result (Theorem 1). In fact,
many of these lemmas do not make any use of the specific
structure of the functions g(ρ) and Q(·), and we state them in
a more general form. Later, in order to provide more closed-
form approximation results, we specialize these lemmas to the
specific choice of g(ρ) given in (6) and linear loss function
Q(y) = y. It is worth noting that although we assumed that
the learning algorithm starts with equal initial weight for both
experts (i.e., the initial relative weight of the adversary is 0.5),
however, we state our results for an offline adversary with
generic initial relative weight ρ. The reason for this choice
would become apparent subsequently.
Lemma 1. Given a loss function l(yˆ, y) := Q(|yˆ − y|), with
Q(·) : [0, 1]→ R≥0 being an arbitrary function, the expected
loss given in (4) is fully determined by the initial relative
weight of the adversary ρ, his policy Ψ := (x11, . . . , x
1
n) ∈
{T, L}N , and the horizon length N .
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on N . For N = 1,
the statement becomes trivial. Let us assume that the statement
is correct for N − 1 stages and denote the expected loss of
the system for a generic policy Ψ of the offline adversary
by V ΨN−1(ρ) :=
∑N−1
k=1 Ex21,...,x2k [l(yˆk, yk)]. Now depending
on whether the adversary lies or tells the truth in the first
stage,
∑N
k=1 Ex21,...,x2k [l(yˆk, yk)] equals to one of the following
terms:
Ex21 [l(yˆ1, y1)|x11 = L] + µV ΨN−1(g(ρ)) + (1− µ)V ΨN−1(ρ),
Ex21 [l(yˆ1, y1)|x11 = T ] + µV ΨN−1(ρ) + (1− µ)V ΨN−1(g−1(ρ)),
(8)
where the first expression is for when x11 = L and the second
one for when x11 = T . Next, we consider two cases:
– Case I: x11 = L. Thus if y1 = 1, we must have x11 = 0, and
hence,
Ex21 [l(yˆ1, y1)|x11 = L] = µ[l(yˆ1, 1)|x11 = 0, x21 = 1]
+ (1− µ)[l(yˆ1, 1)|x11 = 0, x21 = 0]
= µ · l(1− ρ, 1) + (1− µ) · l(0, 1)
= µQ(ρ) + (1− µ)Q(1),
where in the second equality we have used (2). On the other
hand, if y1 = 0, then x11 = 1, and we can write
Ex21 [l(yˆ1, y1)|x11 = L] = µ[l(yˆ1, 0)|x11 = 1, x21 = 0]
+ (1− µ)[l(yˆ1, 0)|x11 = 1, x21 = 1]
= µ · l(ρ, 0) + (1− µ) · l(1, 0)
= µQ(ρ) + (1− µ)Q(1).
– Case II: x11 = T . Again using a similar argument as in Case
I one can easily show that
Ex21 [l(yˆ1, y1)|x11 = T ] = µQ(0) + (1− µ)Q(1− ρ).
Therefore, in either case and regardless of the value of y1,
we have
Ex21 [l(yˆ1, y1)|x11 = L] = µQ(ρ) + (1− µ)Q(1),
Ex21 [l(yˆ1, y1)|x11 = T ] = µQ(0) + (1− µ)Q(1− ρ).
Replacing these expressions into (8) and using the induction
hypothesis, we conclude that
∑N
k=1 Ex21,...,x2k [l(yˆk, yk)] is only
a function of adversary’s initial relative weight ρ, his policy
Ψ, and the horizon length N .
From Lemma 1 one can see that the adversary can take his
optimal actions by only adjusting them relative to the honest
expert’s actions. Henceforth, the expected loss in (4) for a
given policy Ψ := (x11, x
1
2, . . . , x
1
n) of the offline adversary
can be represented by V Ψn (ρ) :=
∑n
k=1 Ex21,...,x2k [l(yˆk, yk)],
where ρ denotes the initial relative weight of the adversary.
Definition 2. Assume the adversary’s initial weight is ρ and
the number of game stages is n. An adversary’s policy is called
a false policy if he lies in all the stages, i.e., x1k = L,∀k ∈ [n].
It is called a true policy if the adversary tells the truth in all
the stages, i.e., x1k = T, ∀k ∈ [n]. We let V fn(ρ) and V hn (ρ)
denote the expected loss of the system obtained by adversary’s
policy being false and true, respectively.
Using the above definition we can obtain closed-form rela-
tions for the expected loss of the false/true policies as given in
the following lemma. We will use these expressions as black-
boxes in our approximation analysis.
Lemma 2. For a loss function l(yˆ, y) := Q(|yˆ − y|), initial
adversary’s weight ρ, and n stages, we have
V fn(ρ) = n(1− µ)Q(1) +
n∑
j=0
P(Z > j)Q(g(j)(ρ)),
V hn (ρ) = nµQ(0) +
n∑
j=0
P(W > j)Q(1− g(−j)(ρ)),
where Z ∼ Bin(n, µ) and W ∼ Bin(n, 1− µ) are Binomial
distributions with parameters µ and 1− µ, respectively.
Proof. Let us fix the adversary’s policy to the false policy,
and we look at all the possible sample paths which can be
realized by predictions of the honest expert. Any sample-path
in which the honest expert predicts correctly i times and makes
a mistake n− i times will occur with the same probability of
µi(1−µ)n−i. There are exactly (ni) of such sample paths, and
5for any of such sample paths, independent of what positions
the honest expert predicts correctly or wrongly, the incurred
loss given the fixed adversary’s false policy equals to
(n− i)Q(1) +
i−1∑
j=0
Q(g(j)(ρ)).
This is because, for any of n − i false predictions of the
honest agent in this sample-path, the system incurs a loss of
Q(1) and by (5) the relative weight of the adversary does
not change. Moreover, for the remaining i correct predictions
and regardless of their order, the system incurs a loss of∑i−1
j=0Q(g
(j)(ρ)) (note that for i = 0 this term equals to 0).
Therefore, by taking an expectation over all possible sample
paths we have,
V fn(ρ) =
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
µi(1− µ)n−i(n− i)Q(1)
+
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
µi(1− µ)n−i
i−1∑
j=0
Q(g(j)(ρ))
= n(1− µ)Q(1) +
n∑
i=0
i−1∑
j=0
(
n
i
)
µi(1− µ)n−iQ(g(j)(ρ))
= n(1− µ)Q(1) +
n−1∑
j=0
n∑
i=j+1
(
n
i
)
µi(1− µ)n−iQ(g(j)(ρ))
= n(1− µ)Q(1) +
n∑
j=0
P(Z > j)Q(g(j)(ρ)),
where in the last equality we have used the fact that Z ∼
Bin(n, µ) and P(Z > n) = 0.
Similarly, to compute V hn (ρ) we can fix the adversary’s
policy to the true policy. Now for any sample-path realized
by the honest expert with i correct predictions, the system
incurs a loss of
i ·Q(0) +
n−i−1∑
j=0
Q(1− g(−j)(ρ)).
Finally, taking an expectation over all sample paths we get
V hn (ρ) =
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
µi(1− µ)n−ii ·Q(0)
+
n∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
µi(1− µ)n−i
n−i−1∑
j=0
Q(1− g(−j)(ρ))
= nµQ(0) +
n−1∑
j=0
n−j−1∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
µi(1− µ)n−iQ(1− g(−j)(ρ))
= nµQ(0) +
n∑
j=0
P(W > j)Q(1− g(−j)(ρ)),
where the second equality is by switching the order of sum-
mations, and the last equality is by W ∼ Bin(n, 1− µ).
Next, we note that every offline policy can be parti-
tioned into several blocks such that within each block the
adversary follows either false or true policies. Thus we
can characterize any offline policy by simply determining
the length of each of its sub-blocks. For this purpose, let
n1,m1, n2,m2, . . . , nk,mk, denote the partition of the entire
horizon N into some sub-horizons of integer length for some
positive integer k such that N =
∑k
i=1(ni + mi), and
mi, ni ∈ Z+ (note that n1 or mk can also be zero). We assume
that the adversary follows the false policy within each block
of length ni, and the true policy within each block of length
mi. Therefore, finding the optimal offline policy reduces to
maximizing the expected loss (4) over all such partitions.
Lemma 3. Given an adversary’s initial relative weight ρ,
the relative weight of the adversary after lying n times and
telling truth m times (in any arbitrary order) equals to
g(X−Y )(ρ), where X ∼ Bin(n, µ) and Y ∼ Bin(m, 1 − µ)
are independent Binomial random variables.
Proof. Let X¯i ∼ Ber(µ) and Y¯i ∼ Ber(1 − µ), i = 1, 2, . . .
be independent Bernoulli random variables, and ρ be the
initial weight of the adversary. Since at each stage the honest
expert predicts independently from the earlier stages, a simple
induction shows that if the adversary’s weight at the beginning
of the kth stage equals to g(U)(ρ) for some random variable U ,
then after the kth stage depending on whether he lies or tells
the truth, his weight will change to g(U+X¯k)(ρ) or g(U−Y¯k)(ρ),
respectively. Therefore, if we know that the adversary lies
exactly n times and tells the truth m times, his relative weight
at the end of this process will be equal to g(X−Y )(ρ), where
X is the sum of n independent Bernoulli random variables
of type X¯i ∼ Ber(µ), and Y is the sum of m independent
Bernoulli random variables of type Y¯i ∼ Ber(1 − µ). This
implies that X ∼ Bin(n, µ) and Y ∼ Bin(m, 1 − µ), and
that X and Y are independent.
Lemma 3 indicates that the distribution of the adversary’s
relative weight, induced by following an offline policy Ψ, only
depends on the total number of times that the adversary lies or
tells the truth, and not on the specific order of them. Note that
this property only holds for the relative weight distribution,
but not for the distribution of the accumulated loss at different
stages of the game. In fact, it can be shown that the distribution
of loss depends critically on the order of the adversary’s
actions, and that is the main difficulty in the analysis of the
optimal offline policy. However, we circumvent this issue in
the following theorem by providing an approximation scheme
that is asymptotically optimal as the number of game stages
approaches infinity.
Theorem 1. For any  ∈ (0, 1), and the absolute loss function
l(yˆ, y) = |yˆ − y|, we have V Ψ
∗
N (0.5)
V fN (0.5)
= 1 + O
(√
log1/N
N
)
,
where V Ψ
∗
N (0.5) and V
f
N (0.5) denote the expected loss by
following the optimal policy and the false policy, respectively.
In particular, the false policy is asymptotically optimal as
N →∞.
Proof. For simplicity and without any loss of generality we
set  = 1e . For general  ∈ (0, 1), the only difference in our
analysis would be that the base of the natural logarithm will
6change to 1 . Using Lemma 2 specialized for the absolute loss
function Q(y) = y, we can write
V fn(ρ) = (1− µ)n+
n∑
j=0
P(Z > j)g(j)(ρ),
V hn (ρ) = (1− µ)n−
n∑
j=0
P(W > j)g(−j)(ρ), (9)
where Z ∼ Bin(n, µ) and W ∼ Bin(n, 1 − µ). For any
arbitrary but fixed ρ ∈ (0, 1), let us define
f(r) := r − ln(1 + aer),
(r) := f(r + 1)− f(r)− g(r)(ρ),
where a := 1ρ − 1 and r ∈ [0,∞). Now we can write,
V fn(ρ) = (1− µ)n+
n∑
j=0
P(Z > j)[f(j + 1)− f(j)− (j)]
= (1− µ)n−
n∑
j=0
P(Z > j)(j)
+
n∑
j=0
[P(Z > j − 1)− P(Z > j)]f(j)− f(0)
= (1− µ)n−
n∑
j=0
P(Z > j)(j) + E[f(Z)]− f(0)
(a)
≤ (1− µ)n+ E[f(Z)]− f(0)
−
n∑
j=0
P(Z > j)
(
1
1 + aej+1
− 1
1 + aej
)
(b)
= (1− µ)n+ E[f(Z)]− f(0) + g(0)(ρ)− E[g(Z)(ρ)]
(c)
= n− E[ln(1 + (1
ρ
− 1)eZ)]− ln(ρ)
+ ρ− E[ 1
1 + ( 1ρ − 1)eZ
],
(10)
where (a) is due to Lemma 4 (Appendix A) which shows that
(r) ≥ 11+aer+1 − 11+aer , and (b) follows from (7) and the
definition of expectation. Finally, (c) follows by substituting
the expressions for f(Z) and g(Z)(ρ). Similarly, to obtain an
upper bound for V hn (ρ), let us define
h(r) := ln(a+ er),
δ(r) := h(r + 1)− h(r)− g(−r)(ρ).
Using identical steps as in the derivation of (10) and since by
Lemma 4, δ(r) ≤ 1
1+ae−(r+1) − 11+ae−r , we get
V hn (ρ) ≤ (1− µ)n− E[ln((
1
ρ
− 1) + eW )]− ln(ρ)
− ρ+ E[ 1
1 + ( 1ρ − 1)e−W
]. (11)
Next let us consider an arbitrary offline policy Ψ character-
ized by its false/true sub-block, i.e., Ψ := n1,m1, . . . , nk,mk.
Denote the expected loss under policy Ψ when the initial
weight of the adversary was 0.5 by V ΨN (0.5). Moreover, for
` = 1, . . . , k, let X¯` ∼ Bin(n`, µ) and Y¯` ∼ Bin(m`, 1− µ)
be pairwise independent Binomial distributions (i.e., for ev-
ery i and every j, X¯i and Y¯j are independent) and define
X` =
∑`
i=1 X¯i, and Y` =
∑`
i=1 Y¯i. Note that the pair X`
and Y` are independent Binomial distributions. By linearity of
expectation, and using Lemma 3 we can write,
V ΨN (0.5) = V
f
n1(0.5) + E
[
V hm1
(
g(X1)(0.5)
)]
+ E
[
V fn2
(
g(X1−Y1)(0.5)
)]
+ E
[
V hm2
(
g(X2−Y1)(0.5)
)]
+ . . .+ E
[
V hmk
(
g(Xk−Yk−1)(0.5)
)]
. (12)
Replacing g(X`−1−Y`−1)(0.5) (or for brevity g(X`−1−Y`−1))
from (7) instead of ρ in (10), and taking expectation we have
E
[
V fn`
(
g(X`−1−Y`−1)
)]
≤ E
[
n` − E
[
ln
(
1 + (
1
g(X`−1−Y`−1)
− 1)eZ
)]]
− E
[
ln
(
g(X`−1−Y`−1)
)]
+ E
[
g(X −`1−Y −`1) − E
[ 1
1+( 1
g(X −`1−Y −`1)
−1)eZ
]]
= n` − E
[
ln
(
1 + eX`−Y`−1
1 + eX`−1−Y`−1
)]
+ E
[ 1
1 + eX`−1−Y`−1
− 1
1 + eX`−Y`−1
]
, (13)
where the equality follows by simplifying the terms and noting
that for the `-the false block Z := X¯` ∼ Bin(n`, µ), which
is independent of X`−1 and Y`−1. Similarly, since for the `-th
true block W := Y¯` ∼ Bin(m`, 1− µ), which is independent
of X` and Y`−1, by replacing gX`−Y`−1(0.5) instead of ρ into
(11) and taking expectation we get
E
[
V hm`
(
g(X`−Y`−1)(0.5)
)]
≤ (1− µ)m` − E
[
ln
(eX`−Y −`1 +eY¯`
1+eX`−Y −`1
)]
+ E
[ 1
1 + eX`−Y`
− 1
1 + eX`−Y −`1
]
. (14)
Finally, substituting (13) and (14) into (12), we can write
V ΨN (0.5) ≤
k∑
`=1
(n` + (1− µ)m`)
− E
[ k∑
`=1
(
ln
(eX`−Y`−1 + eY¯`
1 + eX`−Y`−1
)
+ln
( 1 + eX`−Y`−1
1 + eX`−1−Y`−1
))]
+ 2
k∑
`=1
E
[ 1
1+eX`−Y`
− 1
1+eX`−Y −`1
]
= µM + (1− µ)N−E
[
ln
(
k∏
`=1
eX`−Y`−1 + eY¯`
1 + eX`−1−Y`−1
)]
+O(
√
N lnN)
= (1−µ)N−E
[
ln
(
1+eYk−Xk
2
)]
+O(
√
N lnN)
= (1− µ)N +O(
√
N lnN), (15)
7where the first equality is due to Lemma 8 (Appendix A) and
noting that
∑k
`=1 n` = M and
∑k
`=1m` = N−M . Moreover,
the second equality holds because Y¯` = Y` − Y`−1 (which
causes telescopic cancellation of the product terms inside of
the natural logarithm) and noting that X0 = Y0 = 0, E[Xk] =
µM . Finally, using (9) we know that the expected loss of the
false policy is at least,
V fN (0.5) = (1− µ)N +
N∑
j=0
P(Z>j)g(j)(0.5) ≥ (1− µ)N
(note that all the terms P(Z > j)g(j)(0.5),∀j are nonnega-
tive). This in view of (15) shows that
V Ψ
∗
N (0.5)
V fN (0.5)
= 1 +O
(√ lnN
N
)
.
Remark 1. It is important to distinguish the difference be-
tween the approximation ratio obtained in Theorem 1 and
the sub-linear regret bounds commonly derived in regret
minimization analysis. Here we allow the offline malicious
expert to choose his best-in-hindsight policy over the entire
horizon (i.e., an arbitrary sequence of false/true predictions)
and do not restrict him to his best-in-hindsight action (i.e.,
only select one action and commit to it at all the stages).
Surprisingly, Theorem 1 shows that giving such an extra power
to the malicious expert does not bring him many advantages
other than a negligible additive term.
Theorem 1 suggests that the MW learning algorithm with
absolute loss function is not very robust against malicious
attacks. This is because the malicious expert does not to
be very intelligent or have access to many computational
resources to destroy the outcomes of the MW learning system;
even following a simple false policy can nearly impose the
same loss as any other complex policy.
A. Beyond Asymptotic Optimality for the Offline Policy
Theorem 1 shows that the false policy asymptotically
achieves the same performance as the optimal offline policy.
However, the exact structure of the optimal offline policy for
a finite horizon N can be quite complex. Therefore, our goal
in this section is to take one step further and provide a policy
that closely resembles the structural patterns of the optimal
offline policy. As it was shown in the proof of Theorem 1 one
of the main reasons that there is a gap between the expected
loss of the optimal offline policy and that of the false policy
is the term:
B :=
k∑
`=1
E
[
1
1+eX`−Y`
− 1
1+eX`−Y −`1
]
henceforth referred to as the bonus term. Here, X` ∼
Bin(N`, µ) and Y` ∼ Bin(N`, µ) are independent Binomial
distributions where N` =
∑`
i=1 ni and M` =
∑`
i=1mi.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to expect the optimal offline
policy (or a policy close to optimal), to maximize B in order
to gain as much as possible from the bonus term. As such, we
Fig. 2. Mean and standard deviation adjustment for maximizing the bonus
term B using CDF of the standard normal distribution.
search the optimal offline policy Ψ∗ among policies Ψ that
satisfy the following two criteria:
• i) Ψ imposes at least as much loss as the false policy on
the learning system, i.e., at least (1− µ)N − o(1),
• ii) Ψ maximizes the bonus gain B.
To maximize the bonus term, using Lemma 8 (Appendix
A), it is enough to maximize
k∑
`=1
[
Φ(−µ2`
σ2`
)− Φ(−µ2`−1
σ2`−1
)
]
, (16)
where Φ(·) is the CDF of the standard normal distribution and
µ2`=N`µ−M`(1− µ), σ22` = µ(1− µ)(N` +M`),
µ2`−1 =N`µ−M`−1(1− µ), σ22`−1 =µ(1−µ)(N`+M −`1).
Now by adjusting the argument of Φ(·) in (16) to period-
ically switch around 0 (see Figure 2), we obtain a positive
gain from each of the summands in (16). This suggests that
a policy in which −µ2`σ2` = 1, and −
µ2`−1
σ2`−1
= −1, would be a
good candidate for maximizing the bonus term. Note that here
the choice of 1 or −1 is not strict and it can be replaced by any
two points close to zero such that the difference of the normal
CDF evaluated at those points gives a sufficiently large gain.
Solving −µ2`σ2` = 1 and −
µ2`−1
σ2`−1
= −1, by substituting the
above expressions for µ2`, σ2`, σ2`, σ2`−1, we obtain a ratio
type policy in which the ratio of the false/true block lengths
n`
m`
, ` = 1, 2, . . ., is proportional to 1−µµ . Therefore, to fulfill
both criteria (i) and (ii), we introduce the following offline
ratio policy:
Definition 3. Let a and b be the smallest positive integers such
that ab =
µ
1−µ .
4 We say that Ψˆ is a ratio policy if its block
representation is of the form (n1,m1, . . . ,mk−1, nk,mk) =
(b, a, b, a, b, . . . , a, N2 , 0), where for ` = 1, 2, . . . , k, the adver-
sary lies in n`-blocks and tells the truth in m`-blocks.
To verify why the ratio policy is indeed a good offline
policy, let us denote the number of lies and truths in Ψˆ by M
and N −M , respectively. Due to Definition 3, Ψˆ has many
4Here for simplicity we have assumed that µ
1−µ is a rational number,
otherwise, we can always find positive integers such that a
b
∼= µ1−µ .
8Fig. 3. Performance comparision of the ratio and false policies for three different accuracies µ = 0.5, 0.8, 0.4. In each figure the red curve illustrate the
expected loss of the system for the ratio policy while the blue curve corresponds to the false policy.
more lies than the truth in its structure (note that nk = N2 ).
Thus a similar analysis as in Lemma 2 for the false policy
reveals that the expected loss in Ψˆ which is obtained from
its last block nk = N2 is almost the same as the false policy
minus a negligible constant which does not depend on N . As
a result, the expected loss of Ψˆ which is obtained due to its
heavy tail of false predictions is at least (1−µ)N − o(1). On
the other hand, the ratio policy Ψˆ gains extra bonus due to
its first N2 stages. To evaluate the bonus term B for the ration
policy Ψˆ, we observe that due to Definition 3, µ2` = 0, and
µ2`−1 = µb, for all ` ∈ [k]. Thus, for each ` ∈ [k], we have
Φ(−µ2`
σ2`
)− Φ(−µ2`−1
σ2`−1
) = Φ(0)− Φ(− µb
σ2`−1
) > 0.
In other words, each of these terms contributes positively with
some constant amount to the bonus B. Since we chose a and
b as the smallest positive integers such that ab =
µ
1−µ , this
assures that the number of summands k in the bonus term
B (which equals the number of switching between false/true
blocks) is maximized. This is exactly why we defined our
ratio policy the way we did in Definition 3. This shows that
the expected loss of the ratio policy is at least as high as that
for the false policy (satisfying criterion (i)) with an additional
bonus term B (satisfying criterion (ii)).
The out-performance of the ratio policy compared to the
false policy has been numerically justified in Figure 3. As can
be seen in all the figures the ratio policy (red curve) imposes
strictly more loss than the false policy (blue curve). Moreover,
the gain of the bonus term B which is the difference between
the curves in each figure will increase as the number of stages
increases. Also, one can see that for smaller values of µ the
gap between the ratio policy and the false policy is less while
for larger µ this difference is more pronounced. In fact, we
have observed that the ratio policy closely mimics the structure
of the optimal policy. For instance, in the left subfigure of
Figure 3 we have shown the optimal loss for several values
of N = 10, 12, 20, 22, 24, 26 using black dots. As it is evident
these values are very close to the expected loss of the proposed
ratio policy and coincide in certain cases (e.g., N = 12). We
believe that the optimal offline policy for finite N belongs to
the class of ratio policies given that one could properly round
the block lengths using the CDF of the normal distribution.
IV. OPTIMAL ONLINE POLICY FOR THE ABSOLUTE LOSS
FUNCTION
In this section, we consider the problem of finding the
optimal online policy for the malicious expert, where we recall
that the online adversary is the one who chooses his next action
adaptively based on all the past revealed information up to the
current stage. In order to be able to find the optimal online
policy we first cast it as a dynamic program and then show
that it can be solved efficiently in quadratic time O(N2).
For this purpose, let us assume again that the malicious
expert is expert 1 and the other expert is the honest one who
makes a correct prediction with probability µ. We assume that
at stage k, expert 1 knows the true outcome yk, the accuracy
µ of the honest expert, and the entire history of predictions up
to stage k − 1, i.e., {p˜1` , p˜2` , x1` , x2` , y` : ∀` ∈ [k − 1]}. Given
this information set, the goal of the online malicious expert
is to produce a sequence of predictions {x1k}Nk=1 over a fixed
finite horizon N to maximize the expected accumulated loss
of the system given by (4). Now let us define the state of the
system at stage k to be the relative weight of the adversary
at that stage, i.e., p˜1k . Note that as p˜
1
k + p˜
2
k = 1,∀k, knowing
p˜1k is sufficient to determine the relative weight of the honest
expert p˜2k.
Next let us define cx1k(p˜
1
k) to be the current loss that the
online adversary can impose on the system at stage k by taking
the action x1k, i.e.,
cx1k(p˜
1
k) := Ex2k [|yˆk−yk||x
1
1] =
{
1− µ+ µp˜1k if x1k = L,
(1− µ)(1− p˜1k) if x11 = T,
(17)
where the second equality is by Lemma 1 specialized to
the absolute loss function Q(y) = y. We can then cast the
adversary’s online optimal policy as a solution to an MDP
in which the malicious expert’s action at stage k imposes a
current loss of cx1k(p˜
1
k) on the system and changes the state
from p˜1k to the next state p˜
1
k+1. In particular, the state transition
of this MDP is given by the update rule (5), that is,
p˜1k+1 =

g(p˜1k) if x
1
k = L, x
2
k = T,
g(−1)(p˜1k) if x
1
k = T, x
2
k = L,
p˜1k if x
1
k = x
2
k.
(18)
9Algorithm 1 DP Algorithm
Initialize: VN (·) = cN (·) = 0.
For each step k = N − 1 downto 1, find the optimal action
x∗k := arg max
x1k
{
cx1k(p˜
1
k) + E[V ∗k+1(p˜1k+1)]
}
,
and the optimal value function,
V ∗k (p˜
1
k) = max
x1
k
{
cx1
k
(p˜1k) + E[V ∗k+1(p˜1k+1)]
}
. (20)
Output: sequence x∗N−1, V ∗N−1(·), ..., x∗0, V ∗0 (·).
Now the solution to this MDP can be obtained using
dynamic programming as shown in Algorithm 1. In this
algorithm V ∗k+1(·) denotes the optimal value function, i.e.,
the optimally accumulated loss from time step k + 1 onward.
In particular, from Lemma 1, one can easily see that the
optimal value function does not depend on the sequence of true
outcomes and is only a function of the state and the number
of remaining stages. Now by substituting the closed form
expressions of the current cost (17) and the state transition
(18) into the DP Algorithm 1, and letting ρ := p˜1k for brevity,
we obtain the following closed-form recursion for computing
the optimal value function:
V ∗k (ρ)=max
{
1−µ+ µρ+ µV ∗k+1(g(ρ)) + (1−µ)V ∗k+1(ρ),
(1−µ)(1−ρ) + (1−µ)V ∗(g(−1)(ρ)) + µV ∗k+1(ρ)
}
,
(19)
where the first term in the maximization (19) corresponds
to the adversary’s action at stage k being x1k = L, and
the second term corresponds to the adversary’s action being
x1k = T . Unfortunately, due to the nonlinear structure of
the transition functions g(ρ) and g(−1)(ρ), as well as their
joint convex/concave structure, solving the recursion (19) in a
closed-form seems to be a tedious task. Although at each stage
of the above recursion one needs to consider the maximum of
two alternatives (so that the number of alternatives will grow
exponentially in terms of the number of stages), however, in
the following theorem we show that most of these alternatives
collapse on each other so that the optimal value function in
(19) can be computed efficiently in polynomial time.
Theorem 2. The optimal policy for the online malicious expert
can be found in O(N2), where N is the number of stages.
Proof. Let us consider a decision tree with a root node
representing the initial relative weight of the adversary (i.e.,
ρ = 0.5) and such that the nodes in the k-th level of the tree
that are at distance k from the root represent all the possible
relative weights of the adversary after k stages (Figure 4).
The key observation is that due to the property of g(·) and its
inverse g(−1)(·), the size of this decision tree does not grow
exponentially such as a binary tree. In fact, a simple induction
shows that the nodes in the k-th level of the tree can be
grouped to form exactly 2k−1 nodes representing all possible
relative weights of the adversary up to stage k, given by
Fig. 4. Illustration of the first level (root) and the second level of the decision
tree. The top actions connecting the root to the intermediate black circles
correspond to the honest expert’s decisions. The bottom actions connecting the
black circles to the second level of the tree correspond to the malicious expert’s
decisions. Although the second level originally has four nodes, however, two
of them can be grouped and be reduced to only three states. The weights on
the dashed paths simply denote the loss of the system by following that path.
g(−k)(0.5), g(−k+1)(0.5), . . . , g(k−1)(0.5), g(k)(0.5).5 There-
fore, the total number of tree nodes by such grouping (states
in the DP) after N stages is at most
∑N
k=1(2k−1) = O(N2).
As a result, solving the dynamic recursion (19) backward by
moving from the tree leaves toward the root, the number of
computations to find the optimal online policy using the DP
recursion (19) is at most O(N2).
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we considered an adversarial learning system
with two experts of whom one is malicious. The malicious
expert aims to impose the maximum loss on the system
by strategically reporting false predictions. We analyzed the
optimal policy for the malicious expert under both offline
and online settings. In the offline setting, we showed that
finding the optimal policy for the adversary is essentially a
hard discrete optimization problem whose solution can be
approximated within a negligible (sub-linear) additive term.
In particular, we provided a more refined policy that closely
mimics the behavior of the optimal offline policy. We then
considered the optimal policy for the online malicious expert
and showed that it can be efficiently computed in quadratic
time using dynamic programming.
This work opens many interesting directions for future
research. It would be interesting to see whether the structure
of the optimal policy for the online adversary can be charac-
terized in a closed-form. One possible direction is to leverage
the dynamic recursion (19) to show that the optimal value
function possesses some nice properties such as convexity or
L#-convexity [20]. This allows us to prove a class of optimal
threshold policies for the online adversary [21]. Another
interesting direction is to use learning schemes other than
the MW algorithm (e.g., upper confidence bound algorithm)
5Using Lemma 3, one can even compute the distribution of the weights on
the reduced nodes efficiently using Binomial distributions.
10
as the underlying learning scheme and study their robustness
against adversarial attacks. More generally, what learning
scheme would give us the best robustness performance? When
there are many experts in the system can we use mean-field
approximation as an effective tool to approximate the optimal
policies? Finally, finding/approximating optimal policies for
other classes of loss functions is another interesting problem.
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APPENDIX A
AUXILIARY LEMMAS
Lemma 4. Let f(r) = r − ln(1 + aer), h(r) = ln(a+ er),
(r) := f(r + 1)− f(r)− g(r)(ρ),
δ(r) := h(r + 1)− h(r)− g(−r)(ρ).
Then for any r ≥ 0 we have,
0 ≥ (r) ≥ 1
1 + aer+1
− 1
1 + aer
,
0 ≤ δ(r) ≤ 1
1 + ae−(r+1)
− 1
1 + ae−r
,
where we recall that a = 1ρ − 1, for some ρ ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Since ddr (r) =
aer(aer−e+2)
(1+aer)2(1+aer+1) has only one root
given by er = e−2a , by evaluating (r) in the root of its
derivative as well as the boundary of its domain we get,
(r) =

e−2
e−1 − ln(e− 1) < 0 if er = e−2a ,
1 + ln( 1+a1+ae )− 1a+1 ≤ 0 if, r = 0,
0 if a=0, or r→∞,or a→∞ .
This shows that (r) ≤ 0, ∀r, a ∈ [0,∞). On the other hand,
for every r > 0, using the Mean-value Theorem we have
f(r + 1) − f(r) = f ′(ηr), for some ηr ∈ [r, r + 1]. Since
f ′(ηr) = 11+aeηr >
1
1+aer+1 , using (7) we can write,
(r) = f(r + 1)− f(r)− g(r)(ρ)
≥ 1
1 + aer+1
− g(r)(ρ)
=
1
1 + aer+1
− 1
1 + aer
.
Similarly, ddr δ(r) = − ae
r(er−(e−2)a)
(a+er)2(a+er+1) , which has only one
root at er = (e−2)a. Therefore, by evaluating δ(r) in the root
of its derivative as well as the boundary points one can easily
see that δ(r) ≥ 0. Again, using the Mean-value Theorem, there
exists ζr ∈ [r, r + 1] such that h(r + 1) − h(r) = h′(ζr) =
1
1+ae−ζr ≤ 11+ae−(r+1) . This shows that,
δ(r) ≤ 1
1 + ae−(r+1)
− g(−r)(ρ)
=
1
1 + ae−(r+1)
− 1
1 + ae−r
.
Lemma 5. Let m1,m2, . . . ,mk be positive integers and define
M` :=
∑`
j=1mj , ` ∈ [k], (by convention we let M0 = 0).
Then
∑k
`=1
m`√
M`
= O(
√
Mk lnMk).
Proof. Starting from the left-hand side and using Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality, we have,
k∑
`=1
m`√
M`
=
k∑
`=1
√
m` ×
√
m`
M`
≤
√
Mk
√√√√ k∑
`=1
m`
M`
. (21)
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Next for every `, we can write
m`
M`
=
1
m`+M`−1
+
1
m`+M`−1
+. . .+
1
m`+M`−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
m` times
≤ 1
1+M`−1
+
1
2+M`−1
+. . .+
1
m`+M`−1
.
Summing the above relation for all ` = 1, . . . , k, we get
k∑
`=1
m`
M`
≤
k∑
`=1
1
1+M`−1
+
1
2+M`−1
+. . .+
1
m`+M`−1
=
Mk∑
j=1
1
j
≤ 1 + lnMk.
Using this relation into (21) we get the desired bound.
Lemma 6 (Berry-Esseen Theorem [22]). Let Vi be inde-
pendent random variables with mean ai and variance s2i , and
define St :=
∑t
i=1 Vi. Then there exists an absolute constant
c0 such that for all t the CDF of St, denoted by Ft(x), satisfies
sup
x
∣∣∣Ft(x)− Φ(x−∑ti=1 ai√∑t
i=1 s
2
i
)∣∣∣ ≤ c0 maxi{E|Xi−ai|3s2i }√∑t
i=1 s
2
i
.
Lemma 7. Let X ∼ Bin(n, µ) and Y ∼ Bin(m, (1 − µ))
be two independent Binomial distributions. Then, there exists
a constant c such that
∣∣∣E[ 11+eX−Y ]− Φ(− νσ )∣∣∣ ≤ cσ , where
ν = nµ− (1− µ)m, σ2 = µ(1− µ)(n+m), and Φ(·) is the
CDF of the standard normal distribution.
Proof. Let p(γ) and F (γ) denote the pmf and CDF of the
random variable X − Y , respectively. Then,∣∣∣F (0)− E[ 1
1 + eX−Y
]
∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣P(X − Y ≤ 0)− E[ 1
1 + eX−Y
]
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣ 0∑
i=−∞
p(i)−
∞∑
i=−∞
p(i)
1 + ei
∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣ ∞∑
i=0
p(−i)
1 + ei
−
∞∑
i=1
p(i)
1 + ei
∣∣∣
≤
∞∑
i=0
p(−i)
1 + ei
+
∞∑
i=0
p(i)
1 + ei
≤
∞∑
i=0
p(−i)e−i +
∞∑
i=0
p(i)e−i
≤ 2pmax
∞∑
i=0
e−i
=
2e
e− 1pmax,
(22)
where pmax = maxi{p(i)}. Next, using Berry-Esseen The-
orem (Lemma 6), and noting that X and Y can be written
as sum of n and m independent Bernoulli random variables
Ber(µ) and Ber(1− µ), respectively, we get
sup
γ
∣∣∣F (γ)− Φ(γ − ν
σ
)∣∣∣ ≤ c0(µ2 + (1− µ)2)
σ
. (23)
Now for every i we can write,
p(i) = F (i)− F (i− 1)
≤ Φ( i− ν
σ
)− Φ( i− 1− ν
σ
) +
2c0(µ
2 + (1− µ)2)
σ
≤ Φ′(η)×
(
i− ν
σ
− i− 1− ν
σ
)
+
2c0(µ
2 + (1− µ)2)
σ
=
1√
2pi
e−
η2
2 × 1
σ
+
2c0(µ
2 + (1− µ)2)
σ
≤ 1√
2piσ
+
2c0(µ
2 + (1− µ)2)
σ
=
c1
σ
(24)
where c1 := 1√2pi + 2c0(µ
2 + (1 − µ)2). The first inequality
is due to (23) and the second inequality is by Mean-value
Theorem for some η ∈ [ i−1−νσ , i−νσ ]. As a result, pmax ≤ c1σ .
Substituting (24) into (22), we have∣∣∣F (0)− E[ 1
1 + eX−Y
]
∣∣∣ ≤ 2ec1
(e− 1)σ . (25)
Finally, adding (25) with (23) when γ = 0, and using the
triangle inequality, we get∣∣∣E[ 1
1 + eX−Y
]− Φ(−ν
σ
)
∣∣∣ ≤ 2ec1
(e− 1)σ +
c0(µ
2 + (1− µ)2)
σ
=
c
σ
,
where c := 2ec1e−1 +c0(µ
2 +(1−µ)2) is a positive constant.
Lemma 8. Let X` ∼ Bin(N`, µ), Y` ∼ Bin(M`, 1 − µ),
` ∈ [k], be mutually independent Binomial distributions (i.e.,
for every i 6= j, Xi and Yj are independent). Moreover, assume
N` =
∑`
i=1 ni and M` =
∑`
i=1mi, where ni,mi are positive
integers, and Nk+Mk = N . Then B :=
∑k
`=1 E
[
1
1+eX`−Y` −
1
1+eX`−Y`−1
]
= O(
√
N lnN).
Proof. For any ` = 1, . . . , k, define
µ2` := N`µ−M`(1−µ), σ22` := µ(1−µ)(N`+M`),
µ2 −`1 := N`µ−M −`1(1−µ), σ22 −`1 := µ(1−µ)(N`+M −`1),
(26)
where M` =
∑`
i=1mi and N` =
∑`
i=1 ni (recall that mi and
ni denote, respectively, the lengths of the ith true and false
blocks in an offline policy Ψ). Using Lemma 7 we can write
B
(a)
≤ 2
k∑
`=1
[
Φ(−µ2`
σ2`
)− Φ(−µ2`−1
σ2`−1
) + c
(
1
σ2`
+
1
σ2`−1
)]
(b)
≤2
k∑
`=1
[
Φ(−µ2`
σ2`
)− Φ(−µ2`−1
σ2`−1
)
]
+
2c√
µ(1− µ)
k∑
`=1
(
1√
2`
+
1√
2`− 1
)
≤ 2
k∑
`=1
[
Φ(−µ2`
σ2`
)− Φ(−µ2`−1
σ2`−1
)
]
+
2c√
µ(1−µ)
∫ 2k
0
1√
x
dx
(c)
≤ 2
k∑
`=1
[
Φ(−µ2`
σ2`
)− Φ(−µ2`−1
σ2`−1
)
]
+ 4c
√
N
µ(1− µ) ,
(27)
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where (a) is due to Lemma 7, and (b) holds because
N` + M` =
∑`
i=1(ni + mi) is the sum of 2` positive
integers, and thus σ2` ≥
√
2µ(1− µ)` (similarly σ2`−1 ≥√
µ(1− µ)(2`− 1)). Finally (c) holds because 2k ≤ N .
We proceed by showing a sub-linear upper bound on∑k
`=1
[
Φ(−µ2`σ2` )−Φ(−
µ2`−1
σ2`−1
)
]
. Let β be a constant defined by
β := 1√
2piµ(1−µ) . Using the Mean-Value Theorem and since
Φ′(x) = 1√
2pi
e−
x2
2 ≤ 1√
2pi
,∀x, we can write,
k∑
`=1
[
Φ(−µ2`
σ2`
)− Φ(−µ2`−1
σ2`−1
)
]
≤
k∑
`=1
1√
2pi
(
µ2`−1
σ2`−1
− µ2`
σ2`
)
= β
k∑
`=1
(
N`µ−M`−1(1− µ)√
N` +M`−1
− N`µ−M`(1− µ)√
N` +M`
)
≤ β
k∑
`=1
(
−M`−1√
N` +M`−1
+
M`√
N` +M`
)
≤ β
k∑
`=1
M` −M`−1√
N` +M`
= β
k∑
`=1
m`√
N` +M`
≤ β
k∑
`=1
m`√
M`
.
Finally, using Lemma 5 and noting that
∑k
`=1m` ≤ N , we
obtain
k∑
`=1
[
Φ(−µ2`
σ2`
)− Φ(−µ2`−1
σ2`−1
)
]
= O(
√
N lnN). (28)
This together with (27) completes the proof.
